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Tort: Negligence and Occupiers' Liability
Year 1 / ASYear 2 / A-LevelAQA, OCR, WJEC/Eduqas
Negligence end-to-end — duty of care (Donoghue, Caparo, Robinson), breach, causation and remoteness, psychiatric injury and pure economic loss — plus occupiers' liability under the 1957 and 1984 Acts for AQA 3.3.2-3.3.3, OCR 2.2.2-2.2.3 and WJEC/Eduqas Component 2.
🎯 Learning Objectives
Apply the Caparo three-part test for a duty of care and explain the neighbour principle (Donoghue v Stevenson) (AQA 3.3.2; OCR 2.2.2; WJEC/Eduqas Component 2)
Assess duty of care for omissions and public bodies, including Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, Hill, Michael and Poole Borough Council
Evaluate breach against the standard of care, including Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee, Bolitho, Nettleship v Weston and Mullin v Richards
Apply factual causation (but-for test; material contribution), legal causation, remoteness (The Wagon Mound (No 1); Hughes v Lord Advocate) and intervening acts
Distinguish primary and secondary victims for psychiatric injury (Page v Smith; Alcock; White) and the recoverability of pure economic loss (Murphy v Brentwood; Spring v Guardian Assurance)
State and apply the common duty of care under the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 and the s.1(3) conditions of the 1984 Act for trespassers
Apply civil defences — volenti non fit injuria, contributory negligence and illegality — with Froom v Butcher, Pitts v Hunt and Revill v Newbery
Deploy the structure of a negligence problem answer in 25-mark AQA and 20-mark OCR/WJEC scenario questions
📋 Key Definitions and Core Concepts
Duty of care: A legal obligation to take reasonable care not to cause foreseeable harm to a neighbour; tested under Caparo Industries plc v Dickman — foreseeability, proximity, fair, just and reasonable.
Neighbour principle: Donoghue v Stevenson: you must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour — persons closely and directly affected by your act.
Breach of duty: Falling below the standard of the reasonable person: omission to do what a reasonable person would do, or doing what a reasonable person would not (Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks).
Causation in fact: The but-for test: the damage would not have occurred but for the defendant's breach (Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital); multiple sufficient causes use the Fairchild exception.
Causation in law: The breach must be an operative and substantial cause of harm — an intervening act (novus actus interveniens) may break the chain where it is unforeseeable and independent.
Remoteness: Damage must be of a reasonably foreseeable kind, though the precise manner or extent need not be (The Wagon Mound (No 1); Hughes v Lord Advocate; Jolley v Sutton).
Primary victim: A person within the zone of physical danger who suffers psychiatric injury; recoverable if physical injury was foreseeable (Page v Smith).
Secondary victim: A person who suffers psychiatric injury witnessing or hearing of injury to another; recovery restricted by Alcock control mechanisms — ties of love and affection, proximity, perception, sudden shock.
Pure economic loss: Financial loss unconnected with physical injury or property damage (e.g. a defective product's value, negligent misstatement); generally irrecoverable (Murphy v Brentwood), except negligent misstatement with assumption of responsibility (Hedley Byrne v Heller).
Occupier: A person with sufficient control over premises (Wheat v Lacon); there may be more than one occupier, each liable for the areas they control.
Common duty of care: Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, s.2(2): the duty to take such care as in all the circumstances is reasonable to see that visitors are reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes they are invited or permitted.
Volenti non fit injuria: A complete defence where the claimant freely and knowingly consented to the risk; knowledge of risk alone is insufficient (ICI Ltd v Shatwell).
Contributory negligence: Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945: where the claimant partly caused their own damage, damages are reduced by the court's assessment of their share of responsibility (Froom v Butcher).
Res ipsa loquitur: The thing speaks for itself: where the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur without negligence and the defendant controlled the instrumentality, the burden shifts to the defendant to explain.
📌 Key Points
Duty of care: Caparo three-part test (foreseeability, proximity, fair/just/reasonable) — but Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018] reasserted ordinary principles for positive acts, overruling Hill
Omissions are generally not actionable (Smith v Littlewoods; Stovin v Wise), even for public bodies (Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales; Poole Borough Council)
Breach is fact-sensitive: probability (Bolton v Stone), gravity (Paris v Stepney), precautions vs utility (Latimer v AEC); professions use Bolam with the Bolitho logical caveat; learners and children: Nettleship v Weston; Mullin v Richards
Causation: but-for (Barnett); material contribution (Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw); multiple sufficient causes (Fairchild; Barker v Corus); remoteness = foreseeable kind of harm (Wagon Mound; Hughes v Lord Advocate; Jolley v Sutton)
Psychiatric injury: primary victims (Page v Smith) vs secondary victims restricted by Alcock; rescuers must satisfy the primary victim rules (White v Chief Constable; contrast Chadwick)
Pure economic loss is irrecoverable except where the defendant assumed responsibility, e.g. negligent misstatement (Hedley Byrne; Spring v Guardian Assurance) and some solicitor cases (Ross v Caunters)
OLA 1957: visitors, common duty of care, special rules for children (s.2(3)(a)), workers (s.2(3)(b)), warnings (s.2(4)(a)) and independent contractors (s.2(4)(b))
OLA 1984: trespassers protected only where the s.1(3) conditions are met; Tomlinson and Keown show courts refusing duties where the risk arises from the claimant's own activity
Defences: volenti is complete but rarely succeeds; contributory negligence reduces damages by a percentage (Froom v Butcher); illegality may bar or reduce (Pitts v Hunt; Revill v Newbery)
Duty of care — neighbour principle to Caparo and Robinson (AQA 3.3.2; OCR 2.2.2)
Negligence requires a duty of care, breach and damage caused by the breach, not too remote. The modern starting point is the neighbour principle: Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] — take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure persons closely and directly affected. Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] replaced it with a three-part test: harm of a kind reasonably foreseeable; a relationship of proximity or neighbourhood; and that imposing the duty is fair, just and reasonable. Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] had used a looser two-stage test, but the House of Lords retreated from it: Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] overruled Anns on defective buildings.
Public bodies and omissions. The general rule: there is no liability for omissions — Smith v Littlewoods Organisation [1987]; a highway authority could not be liable merely for failing to act: Stovin v Wise [1996]; Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004]. Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] had exempted the police from duties for investigative failures; that immunity was overruled by Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018] — the Supreme Court held the ordinary principles of negligence apply, and a duty was owed where an officer's positive act (a clumsy arrest) injured a passer-by. But Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales [2015] shows the limits: failing to act on a 999 call created no duty; and R (PNB) v Poole Borough Council [2019] refused duties for child-protection failures absent an assumption of responsibility. For the exam: apply Caparo first; use Robinson for positive acts; use Michael/Poole to refuse omissions-based duties.
Exam traps: duty of care
Robinson did not make police always liable — it removed a blanket immunity; the Caparo test still governs.
Omission claims can succeed where there is control or assumption of responsibility (Barrett v Enfield LBC [2001] — care of a child in council care).
Rescuers: a duty is owed to the rescuer foreseeably endangered (Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967]).
Breach of duty — the reasonable person standard (AQA 3.3.2; OCR 2.2.2)
Breach asks whether the defendant fell below the standard of care: Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) — negligence is doing something a reasonable person would not do, or omitting something a reasonable person would do. The standard is adjusted by who the defendant is: for professions, the defendant meets the standard by acting in accordance with a responsible body of professional practice: Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957], subject to the Bolitho caveat: Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] — the practice must withstand logical analysis. Learners are judged against the competent adult driver, not other learners: Nettleship v Weston [1971]. Children are judged against comparable children: Mullin v Richards [1998] (fencing with plastic rulers).
The standard is also fact-sensitive through the risk factors: probability — a very small risk need not be eliminated: Bolton v Stone [1951] (cricket ball over a high fence); gravity — serious potential harm demands more: Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] (goggles for a one-eyed welder); precautions against utility — only reasonable precautions are required: Latimer v AEC [1953]. Where the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not happen without negligence and the defendant had control, res ipsa loquitur shifts the evidential burden to the defendant.
Causation, remoteness and intervening acts (AQA 3.3.2; OCR 2.2.2)
Factual causation uses the but-for test: Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital [1969] — the patient would have died regardless of the hospital's failure, so no causation; the breach must also be a foreseeable cause: Cork v Kirby MacLean [1952]. Where multiple causes each contributed, the claimant need only show a material contribution: Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw [1956] (pneumoconiosis dust). Where science cannot prove which of several exposures caused the disease, the Fairchild exception applies: Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2002]; Barker v Corus [2006] — liability is shared among the culpable exposures.
Legal causation and remoteness. Damage is recoverable only if it is of a reasonably foreseeable kind: The Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] — oil spill fouling a dock; fire damage unforeseeable. But the manner of the harm need not be foreseeable: Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] (paraffin lamp in a manhole); Jolley v Sutton London Borough Council [2000] (injuring a boat; the kind of harm was foreseeable even if the mechanism was not). Intervening acts break the chain only where they are unforeseeable and independent: medical negligence generally does not break it: Robinson v Post Office [1977] — the employer who caused the fracture remained liable for the doctor's misdiagnosis; a claimant's own unreasonable conduct may, unless the reaction was within the range of foreseeable responses.
Psychiatric injury and pure economic loss (AQA 3.3.2; OCR 2.2.2)
Psychiatric injury is recoverable only as a recognised clinical condition. Primary victims — those within the zone of physical danger — recover if some physical injury was foreseeable: Page v Smith [1996]. Secondary victims — witnesses and those who hear of harm — face the Alcock control mechanisms: Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992]: close ties of love and affection (presumed only for spouses, parents, children); closeness in time and space to the accident or its immediate aftermath; perception through their own unaided senses; and a sudden shocking event. Rescuers must satisfy the primary victim rules to recover: White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] — police officers who suffered psychological injury could not recover as secondary victims; contrast Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967], where the rescuer within the danger zone recovered.
Pure economic loss — financial loss unconnected with personal injury or property damage — is generally irrecoverable to avoid indeterminate liability: Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] (the cost of replacing defective houses). The exception is negligent misstatement with assumption of responsibility: Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd [1964] (with a disclaimer negating the duty there); Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] — a duty of care is owed in giving references. Some special relationships allow recovery: Ross v Caunters [1980] — a solicitor careless in drafting a will owed a duty to the intended beneficiary. Consequential economic loss flowing from physical injury or property damage is always recoverable.
Exam traps: psychiatric injury and economic loss
Always classify the claimant first: primary or secondary victim, or economic loss — the rules differ completely.
Alcock categories are strict: a friend outside ties of love and affection rarely recovers (contrast spouses and parents).
For AO3, criticise the arbitrary divide: pure economic loss often matters more to a claimant than minor personal injury.
Occupiers' liability 1957 and 1984, and defences (AQA 3.3.3; OCR 2.2.3; WJEC/Eduqas Component 2)
Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 governs lawful visitors (invitees, licensees, those with contractual permission, those with a right of entry by statute). An occupier is the person with sufficient control: Wheat v Lacon and Co Ltd [1966] — more than one occupier is possible. Section 2(2) imposes the common duty of care: such care as in all the circumstances is reasonable to see that visitors are reasonably safe for the purpose of their visit. Children (s.2(3)(a)): the occupier must be prepared for children to be less careful than adults; a warning must be effective for a child too young to read: Laverton v Kiapasha (1967). Workers (s.2(3)(b)): the occupier may expect workmen to guard against risks incident to their trade: General Cleaning Contractors v Christmas [1953]. Warnings (s.2(4)(a)) discharge the duty only if they enable the visitor to be reasonably safe: Roles v Nathan [1963] (chimney sweep fumes). Independent contractors (s.2(4)(b)): the occupier is liable if the contractor was careless, or the work was improper, or the occupier failed to check: Haseldine v Daw [1941] (negligently maintained lift); Ogwo v Taylor [1988] (firefighter injured; occupier liable); but not where the main contractor directed an unsafe system: Ferguson v Welsh [1988].
Occupiers' Liability Act 1984 protects trespassers. A duty arises only if the s.1(3) conditions are met: the occupier is aware of the danger or has reasonable grounds to believe it exists; knows or has reasonable grounds to believe the person is, or may come, in the vicinity; and the risk is one against which he may reasonably be expected to offer some protection. This codified the duty recognised in British Railways Board v Herrington [1972]. Section 1(5) excludes risks the trespasser willingly accepts. The courts read the Act narrowly where the risk arises from the claimant's own activity: Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2003] (no duty for diving into a lake); Keown v Coventry Healthcare NHS Trust [2006] (climbing a drainpipe); Ratcliff v McConnell [1999] (diving into an unlit pool at night after drinking); Donoghue v Folkestone Properties [2003] (seasonal risk). Where the duty applies, breaches still sound in damages — but reduced: Revill v Newbery [1996] (76-year-old with a gun trap; trespasser recovered, damages cut by 75% for contributory negligence).
Defences.Volenti non fit injuria is a complete defence but requires free and knowing consent to the risk, not mere knowledge: ICI Ltd v Shatwell [1965]; spectators accept inherent risks (Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933]); rescuers do not consent: Haynes v Harwood [1935]. Contributory negligence reduces damages by the claimant's share of responsibility (Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945): Froom v Butcher [1976] — 25% where a seatbelt would have prevented injury, 50% where it would have made a substantial difference; Sayers v Harlow Urban District Council [1958] — 20% split. Illegality (ex turpi causa) may bar claims arising from the claimant's own crime: Pitts v Hunt [1991] (pillion passenger on a stolen bike encouraging reckless riding); but Revill v Newbery shows it usually reduces rather than bars in modern law.
💡 Worked Example
Exam-style: Ola, the occupier of a block of flats, has failed to repair a lift maintained by an independent contractor; the lift drops two floors and Priya, a lawful visitor, breaks her wrist and later suffers a recognised depressive illness. Separately, Ravi, a surveyor, carelessly values a house for a prospective buyer, Priya, who relies on the valuation and overpays by £40,000. Discuss the liability of Ola and Ravi. (AQA 7162 Paper 2 style problem question, 25 marks)
Mark-scheme logic: AO1 — state the law: negligence requires duty (Donoghue v Stevenson; Caparo Industries plc v Dickman), breach (Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks) and causation (but-for; Wagon Mound (No 1)); occupiers owe the common duty of care to visitors under Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 s.2(2) and are liable for independent contractors under s.2(4)(b) (Haseldine v Daw; Ogwo v Taylor); pure economic loss is irrecoverable except on assumption of responsibility (Hedley Byrne v Heller; Spring v Guardian Assurance; Ross v Caunters). AO2 — apply: OLA: Priya is a lawful visitor; Ola is the occupier (Wheat v Lacon). The common duty of care extends to the lift: failure to repair is a breach; under s.2(4)(b) Ola is liable for the contractor's negligence (Haseldine v Daw) and for failing to check; factual causation is straightforward (but for the unrepaired lift, no fall); the wrist fracture is foreseeable; psychiatric injury: Priya is a primary victim — foreseeable physical injury suffices for the depression (Page v Smith). RAVI: pure economic loss of £40,000 is not generally recoverable (Murphy v Brentwood); but a surveyor valuing for a prospective buyer assumes responsibility — duty owed under the Hedley Byrne principle (Spring v Guardian Assurance; Ross v Caunters); breach on the facts; the buyer relied and the loss flowed directly; duty not excluded. Damages: expectation-based economic loss recoverable here; no volenti (no knowledge of the lift defect); contributory negligence not indicated. AO3 — evaluation: the special-status rules (children s.2(3)(a), workers s.2(3)(b)) show the 1957 Act calibrating duty to visitor type; the Hedley Byrne exception to Murphy v Brentwood is principled (voluntary assumption) but leaves the general bar on economic loss arbitrary; Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018] shows the courts refusing blanket immunities. Conclude: Ola liable for the wrist injury and depression (1957 Act, s.2(2) and s.2(4)(b)); Ravi liable for the £40,000 under the negligent-misstatement exception.
❓ Practice Questions & Mark Schemes
Tom, a police officer, knocked Priya to the ground while making an arrest; separately, the force failed to send officers after Priya's 999 call reporting an intruder, and she was injured. Discuss whether a duty of care was owed in each situation. (15 marks)
Answer: AO1: negligence requires a duty of care under Caparo (foreseeability, proximity, fair, just and reasonable); the general rule is no liability for omissions (Smith v Littlewoods; Stovin v Wise); Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] had exempted police investigative failures; Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018] overruled Hill and applied ordinary principles to positive acts; Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales [2015] refused a duty for failure to act on a 999 call. AO2: the arrest — a positive act causing foreseeable physical injury to a nearby passer-by satisfies Caparo and, per Robinson, a duty is owed. The 999 failure — an omission; Michael is directly on point: no duty arises for failing to act, absent an assumption of responsibility; Caparo's fair/just/reasonable limb points against imposing duties that divert police resources. AO3: Robinson removes blanket immunity but leaves omissions untouched; argue whether the distinction between acts and omissions is principled (Michael's reasoning) or formalistic; note Poole Borough Council [2019] confirming the restrictive approach to public authority omissions. Conclude: duty owed for the arrest; no duty for the 999 failure.
Wayne, a learner driver, swerved to avoid a cat and crashed; would his liability differ if he were a qualified doctor driving home after a 24-hour shift? Discuss breach. (15 marks)
Answer: AO1: breach is falling below the reasonable person standard (Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks); the standard is not adjusted for learners — Nettleship v Weston [1971] judged the learner against the competent adult driver; professions are judged against responsible professional practice (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee), subject to Bolitho v City and Hackney HA [1998]; risk factors: probability (Bolton v Stone), gravity (Paris v Stepney), precautions vs utility (Latimer v AEC). AO2: Wayne — learner standard is the full driver standard; a momentary swerve to avoid a cat is what the reasonable driver would do; volenti between driver and instructor may apply (Nettleship), but against a third party the full standard applies. The doctor — an ordinary driver standard applies to driving; fatigue does not lower the standard for ordinary road users; the Bolam professional standard is irrelevant because driving is not a professional skill, though self-induced incapacity is no excuse. AO3: Nettleship is criticised for ignoring the learner's objective incompetence but defended for protecting third parties; the Bolam/Bolitho divide shows courts calibrating standards by activity, not identity. Conclude: both are judged by the ordinary reasonable driver standard; liability does not differ on standard, though defences may.
Fairchild Ltd exposed three workers to asbestos; each developed mesothelioma. Priya inhaled dust from a single source. Explain how causation operates for each worker. (10 marks)
Answer: AO1: factual causation uses the but-for test (Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital); a material contribution suffices for indivisible disease (Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw); where several exposures each could have caused the injury and science cannot distinguish, the Fairchild exception applies (Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2002]; Barker v Corus [2006]); remoteness requires a foreseeable kind of harm (The Wagon Mound (No 1)). AO2: the three workers — mesothelioma is indivisible and any single exposure could have caused it; but-for fails; the Fairchild exception makes each culpable exposure liable, with liability apportioned per Barker v Corus. Priya — a single-source exposure: but-for is satisfied (but for her employer's breach, no disease); ordinary causation applies, no Fairchild needed. AO3: Fairchild is a principled exception (wrongdoing and increased risk) but stretches causation beyond the but-for test; Barker's apportionment was reversed by statute for mesothelioma (Compensation Act 2006) — a strong legislative-response point. Conclude: the three recover under the Fairchild exception; Priya under ordinary but-for causation.
Ravi watches television as a live news report shows his brother crushed at a football ground; he suffers a recognised psychiatric illness. Would his position differ had he stood two rows away? Discuss. (15 marks)
Answer: AO1: psychiatric injury is recoverable only as a recognised clinical condition; primary victims are in the zone of physical danger and recover if physical injury was foreseeable (Page v Smith); secondary victims face the Alcock control mechanisms: ties of love and affection, proximity in time and space, perception through unaided senses, sudden shock (Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992]); rescuers must satisfy the primary victim rules (White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999]). AO2: watching television — Alcock requires immediate aftermath perception; delayed TV images do not satisfy the proximity and perception requirements, so recovery fails despite the brotherly tie. Two rows away — if Ravi was himself within the zone of danger he is a primary victim (Page v Smith); if outside it but perceiving the accident directly, the Alcock mechanisms are satisfied (parent-child tie presumed; direct perception; sudden shock), so recovery is likely. AO3: the Alcock controls balance floodgates against fairness; critics note the arbitrary line between live perception and television, and Page v Smith's low threshold for primary victims has been narrowed (Hoffman? — use White). Conclude: no recovery via television; likely recovery at the ground.
A council left a boating lake open with no lifeguard; Priya, 19, dived in after drinking and was paralysed. Discuss the council's liability under the Occupiers' Liability Act 1984. (15 marks)
Answer: AO1: the 1984 Act protects non-visitors; a duty arises only if the s.1(3) conditions are met — awareness of the danger, knowledge or reasonable belief that persons may come into the vicinity, and a risk against which some protection may reasonably be expected (British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] as codified); s.1(5) excludes willingly accepted risks; the courts refuse duties where the risk arises from the claimant's own activity (Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2003]; Keown v Coventry Healthcare NHS Trust [2006]); intoxication and seasonality matter (Ratcliff v McConnell [1999]; Donoghue v Folkestone Properties [2003]). AO2: awareness of danger — the council knew people dived; knowledge of trespassers — the lake was open and used; whether some protection was expected — Tomlinson and Ratcliff say no: the risk arose from Priya's own reckless dive, aggravated by alcohol; warnings or marginal measures would not have deterred. AO3: Tomlinson marks a policy shift against paternalism and for personal responsibility; contrast Revill v Newbery [1996] where a vulnerable trespasser recovered (with a 75% reduction for contributory negligence); argue whether the s.1(3) conditions still leave room for claims against children (Keown suggests not where the activity creates the risk). Conclude: the duty likely does not arise; if it did, liability would be reduced for the claimant's drunken recklessness.
Pure economic loss should be recoverable in negligence like any other loss. Discuss. (25 marks, AQA Paper 2 evaluation style)
Answer: AO1: pure economic loss is financial loss unconnected with injury or property damage; generally irrecoverable (Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991], overruling Anns v Merton LBC [1978]); exceptions rest on assumption of responsibility: negligent misstatement (Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd [1964]; Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995]) and some professional relationships (Ross v Caunters [1980]); consequential economic loss flowing from injury or damage is recoverable. AO2/application: a buyer overpaying on a negligent valuation recovers (Ross v Caunters); a purchaser of a defective house cannot recover the cost of repair (Murphy); a referee entitled to be referenced can recover (Spring). AO3 — for recovery: the loss is real and often greater than minor physical injury; assumption of responsibility already polices floodgates; other common law systems recover it; the contractual alternative often fails (no privity with the negligent valuer). Against: indeterminate liability to unknown persons; insurance markets price pure financial risk better than tort; Murphy's bright line is predictable. Conclusion: the assumption-of-responsibility exception is the principled middle way, but the general bar on economic loss is defensible for administrability; the examiners reward testing Murphy v Brentwood against Hedley Byrne and Spring.
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