Social Influence

🎯 Learning Objectives

• Explain and evaluate the three types of conformity and the dual-process explanations NSI and ISI (AQA 4.1.1)
• Describe Asch's research and situational variables affecting conformity, with AO3 evaluation (AQA 4.1.1)
• Outline Milgram's baseline obedience study and situational variables; explain agency theory and legitimacy of authority (AQA 4.1.1; Edexcel Topic 1)
• Explain resistance to social influence: social support and locus of control; authoritarian personality (AQA 4.1.1)
• Describe and evaluate Moscovici's minority influence research and the role of influence processes in social change (AQA 4.1.1)
• Evaluate social influence research: ethics, lab methods, cultural bias, demand characteristics (OCR Component 2)

📋 Key Definitions and Core Concepts

📌 Key Points

Conformity: types, NSI/ISI and Asch's research (AQA 4.1.1; Edexcel Topic 1)

Conformity is a change in behaviour or opinion as a result of real or imagined group pressure. Kelman (1958) distinguished three types, defined by depth and permanence: compliance (publicly going along with the majority while privately keeping one's own views - superficial and temporary, stopping once group pressure is removed, e.g. laughing at a joke you do not find funny), identification (conforming to the role or group we value and adopting its views while we remain a member - e.g. a new army recruit adopting regimental attitudes) and internalisation (accepting the group's views both publicly and privately - the deepest and most permanent form, e.g. becoming vegetarian after joining an environmental campaign group).

Dual-process explanations explain why we conform. Normative social influence (NSI): we conform to be liked and accepted - an emotional process driven by fear of rejection, producing compliance. Evidence: in Asch's post-experiment interviews many conformers said they did not want to look foolish even though they knew the answers were wrong; Schachter (1951) found those who deviated were rejected by discussion groups. NSI is strongest with strangers (anonymity lets people resist - a variation where responses were written privately reduced conformity) and with friends, where acceptance matters most. Informational social influence (ISI): we conform because we are uncertain and assume the majority is correct - a cognitive process producing internalisation. Evidence: Jenness (1932) - participants' second estimates of beans in a jar shifted towards the group estimate; Lucas et al. (2006) found ISI was greater for harder maths problems, showing uncertainty increases ISI. The A* distinction: NSI is about being liked, ISI about being right; both probably operate together in most real conformity.

Asch (1951, 1956) tested conformity using line judgments: 123 US male undergraduates sat with 6-8 confederates who deliberately gave wrong answers on 12 of 18 'critical' trials. Findings: 75% conformed at least once; 32% of critical trials were conformed to; 25% never conformed. Participants who conformed reported doubting their own perception (distortion of judgement) or knowing they were wrong but conforming to fit in. Asch's variables: (1) group size - 1 confederate produced 3% conformity, 2 produced 13%, 3 reached 32%, after which adding more made little difference (unanimity matters more than size); (2) unanimity - the presence of a dissenter (who gave a different wrong answer) dropped conformity to about 5%, showing a single ally liberates independent behaviour; (3) task difficulty - making the line lengths more similar raised conformity, suggesting ISI increased when the task became more ambiguous.

Evaluation (AO3):

• Artificial task: line judgments are trivial - low ecological validity and possibly demand characteristics, as participants knew they were in a study (though conformity was still substantial).
• Historical/cultural limitations: Perrin and Spencer (1980) repeated the study with UK engineering students in the 1980s and found only one conforming response in 396 trials - suggesting conformity dropped in a less conformist era, though their sample (experts) was also unsuited to the task.
• Cultural bias: Smith and Bond's (1997) meta-analysis found mean conformity of 31% in individualist cultures (US, UK) versus 53% in collectivist cultures (China, Africa), suggesting Asch's findings are culture-bound and that conformity is adaptive in collectivist societies.
• Ethics: participants were deceived (confederates, fake trials) and may have experienced distress; Asch debriefed all participants afterwards.
• Support from Crutchfield (1955): using booths to avoid group face-to-face pressure still produced ~30% conformity, showing social influence operates without direct interaction.

Obedience: Milgram, situational variables and agency theory (AQA 4.1.1; Edexcel Topic 1; OCR Component 2)

Obedience is a form of social influence in which a person follows a direct order, usually from a figure of authority. Milgram (1963) recruited 40 male volunteers (paid $4.50) through a newspaper advert for a supposed study of learning at Yale University. Participants played the 'teacher', delivering what they believed were electric shocks from 15V to 450V each time the 'learner' (a confederate, Mr Wallace) made an error, with four standardised prods such as 'The experiment requires that you continue'. Findings: 65% went to the full 450V; 100% went to 300V; only 5% stopped at 300V. Milgram also recorded extreme distress - sweating, trembling, three participants had seizures. The study was supposed to show the 'Germans are different' hypothesis was false: ordinary Americans obeyed destructive orders.

Situational variables (Milgram's later experiments, 1963-1974): proximity - teacher and learner in the same room dropped obedience to 40%; the teacher forcing the learner's hand onto a shock plate gave 30%; the experimenter giving orders by telephone gave 2.5% at 450V (proximity of the victim and authority both matter, with buffers allowing distance to reduce moral strain). Location - moving the study to a run-down office block in Bridgeport dropped obedience to 47.5%, showing the legitimacy of the institution contributes. Uniform - when the experimenter was called away and an ordinary member of the public (in everyday clothes) took over giving orders, obedience fell to 20%; uniforms (lab coat, police) are powerful symbols of legitimate authority - supported by Bickman (1973), where passers-by were more likely to pick up litter or give coins to a man dressed as a security guard than as a milkman or civilian.

Agency theory (Milgram, 1973) explains why people obey: in the autonomous state we behave independently and feel responsible for our actions; under an authority we experience the agentic shift into the agentic state, seeing ourselves as agents of the authority who acts as our moral proxy - so responsibility for harm shifts away from us (moral strain). Binding factors (aspects of the situation that keep us in the agentic state) include fear of appearing rude, gradual commitment (foot-in-the-door: 15V increments make each step feel minor) and buffers separating us from the consequences of our actions. Legitimacy of authority: orders from people of higher status are accepted as justified, especially when backed by institutions - explaining the location effect above.

The dispositional alternative - the authoritarian personality (Adorno, 1950): strict, punishing childhood experiences with conditional love create hostility displaced onto weaker people, extreme respect for authority and conventionalism - measured with the F-scale. Elms and Milgram (1966) found that fully obedient participants scored higher on the F-scale than disobedient ones, supporting a dispositional contribution.

Evaluation (AO3):

• Demand characteristics: Orne and Holland (1968) argued participants guessed the shocks were fake because of the unrealistic setup; however, Sheridan and King (1972) found that when participants believed a real puppy was receiving real shocks, 20 of 26 (77%) delivered the maximum - supporting Milgram's conclusion that obedience is genuine.
• Ecological validity: Milgram's lab was artificial, but Hofling et al. (1966) found 21 of 22 nurses obeyed a doctor's telephone order to give an excessive drug dose (clearly breaching rules), supporting ecological validity in a real hospital setting.
• Ethics: Baumrind (1964) criticised deception and lack of protection from harm; Milgram responded that participants were debriefed, and 84% later reported being 'glad to have taken part'.
• Alternative explanation: Haslam and Reicher (2012) used social identity theory - participants obeyed because they identified with the scientific goals of the experiment ('engaged followership'), not because of blind agentic thinking; Reicher and Haslam (2011) showed followership rose and fell with participants' identification with the cause.
• Methodological strength: highly standardised prods and controls make the procedure replicable and internally valid; replications across cultures (e.g. Meeus and Raaijmakers 1986, 92% of Dutch participants obeying orders to harass a job applicant) support generalisability.

Resistance to social influence: social support and locus of control (AQA 4.1.1)

Social support helps resist conformity and obedience because the presence of an ally breaks unanimity and provides an independent model. In Asch's dissenter variation, conformity fell to about 5% when one confederate gave the correct answer; if the dissenting confederate defected back to the majority, conformity rose again - showing unanimity rather than the answer itself was key. Allen and Levine (1971) found that a dissenter who wore thick glasses and claimed vision problems was just as effective, showing even invalid support liberates resistance. Gamson et al. (1982) provide real-world support: groups of participants were ordered by a fictional company (Hydro Petroleum) to produce evidence to help a company smear an oil leak on a local beach; in groups, participants could discuss and share responsibility, and 88% rebelled - showing that peer support and shared responsibility undermine legitimate authority.

Locus of control (Rotter, 1966) is a dispositional explanation of resistance: internals believe they control their own outcomes (effort determines success), while externals believe outcomes are due to luck, fate or powerful others. Internals are predicted to be more resistant to social influence because they take responsibility for their own actions, are more achievement-oriented and more likely to resist pressure to conform. Evidence: Oliner and Oliner (1988) interviewed over 400 non-Jewish people who protected Jews during the Holocaust and compared them with non-rescuers; rescuers scored higher on internal locus of control and were more likely to have displayed social responsibility. Holland (1967) repeated Milgram-type obedience with internals and externals: 37% of internals did not continue to 450V versus only 23% of externals.

Evaluation (AO3):

• Measurement problem: locus of control is measured by self-report questionnaire (Rotter's IE scale), vulnerable to social desirability and low temporal validity - Twenge et al. (2004) found that young people's locus of control became more external between 1960 and 2002, alongside rises in anxiety and depression, which is inconsistent with the prediction that modern life makes people more internal and resistant.
• Correlational evidence: most support for locus of control is correlational, so a third variable (e.g. confidence, self-esteem) may drive both resistance and internal scores.
• Situational power sometimes wins: in strong situations (Milgram, Zimbardo) even high-internal individuals obeyed, suggesting locus of control explains only mild pressure - Asch-type situations - rather than obedience to authority.
• Practical application: resistance programmes (e.g. smoking resistance training with social support) show that allies reliably reduce peer pressure, supporting the social support explanation.

Minority influence and social change (AQA 4.1.1)

Minority influence occurs when a small group or individual changes the views of the majority. Moscovici et al. (1969): 172 participants in groups of six (4 real participants, 2 confederates) judged the colour of 36 blue slides in an unambiguous task. Findings: a consistent minority (calling all 36 slides green) influenced real participants on 8.4% of trials, and 32% conformed at least once; an inconsistent minority (calling slides green only 24 times) influenced just 1.25% of trials - consistency is essential. A control group without confederates answered incorrectly on only 0.25% of trials.

Three factors determine minority influence: (1) consistency - synchronic (all members agree with each other) and diachronic (agreeing over time); consistency makes others think the minority must have a good reason, suggesting the position is correct (ISI). (2) Commitment - personal sacrifice (e.g. hunger strikes) triggers the augmentation principle: observers assume the minority would not suffer for a weak position, so influence increases. (3) Flexibility - Nemeth (1986) argued that rigid, dogmatic minorities are off-putting; a minority that accepts compromise appears reasonable and cooperative. In Nemeth's mock jury study, when a minority negotiated (proposing to share the compensation payment), influence rose compared with a stubborn minority.

The process: the minority draws attention to the issue, creates conflict in the majority (deep processing, unlike the shallow compliance of majority influence), demonstrates commitment via augmentation, and eventually produces the snowball effect (minority becomes majority) - leaving social cryptomnesia, where people remember the change but forget its origins. Social change applies the same processes: the Suffragettes (consistent messages from 1903, commitment via hunger strikes and Emily Davison's death) gradually won women the vote; the US civil rights movement (Rosa Parks's 1955 refusal, Martin Luther King's consistent non-violent campaigning) used augmentation and the snowball effect. Normative influence also drives social change: Nolan et al. (2008) hung messages on Californian doors stating most residents were trying to reduce energy use ('majority of neighbours agree') and caused significant decreases in energy consumption versus messages about the environment alone - showing NSI is a powerful tool for social change. Milgram's gradual commitment explains why obedience to authority can block social change; his own research illustrates that disobedient peers (dissenters) help others refuse.

Evaluation (AO3):

• Artificial task: Moscovici's colour judgment is trivial, unlike real campaigns (e.g. civil rights) where stakes are high and emotions engaged - limiting generalisability (minority influence may be stronger when issues matter).
• Consistency is necessary but not sufficient: real minorities need resources, organisation and social/political context; research oversimplifies the process.
• Methodological support: Wood et al.'s (1994) meta-analysis of nearly 100 studies confirmed that consistent minorities were most influential, supporting Moscovici's central claim.
• Real-world application: Nemeth applied minority influence to legal decision-making (juries), and public health campaigns use the snowball effect and normative messages - showing ecological validity in application.
• Difference from majority influence: majority influence produces shallow compliance, minority influence deep processing (internalisation) - a distinction examiners reward when explaining social change.

Zimbardo and evaluating social influence research (AQA 4.1.1; OCR Component 2)

Zimbardo (1971-73, Stanford Prison Experiment): 21 male volunteers (screened as psychologically stable) randomly assigned to guards or prisoners in a mock prison in the basement of Stanford University; the planned two-week study was stopped after six days because prisoners showed extreme distress (hunger strikes, crying) while guards became increasingly brutal. Zimbardo concluded that the situation (roles, uniforms, institutional power), not personality, caused the behaviour - supporting a situational explanation of social influence. However, the 'John Wayne' guard later admitted he had deliberately played a cruel role because he thought it was expected of guards, suggesting demand characteristics; Zimbardo also took part as the prison superintendent, blurring the line between researcher and participant. Haslam and Reicher (2006, BBC Prison Study) found guards did not spontaneously identify with their roles and refused to impose power, suggesting tyranny requires an identity-based commitment to a role rather than blind situational forces - a direct challenge to Zimbardo.

General evaluation of social influence research (AO3) - a bank of points usable across all essay questions:

• Lab experiments (Asch, Milgram, Moscovici): high control, standardised procedures and replicability; but artificial, low mundane realism, possible demand characteristics and deception.
• Ethics: deception (confederates), lack of informed consent, protection from harm (Milgram's distressed participants; Zimbardo's prisoners) - all studies would need full debriefing and modern BPS safeguards; the studies nevertheless drove the development of ethical guidelines.
• Cultural bias: most classic research used US samples; collectivist cultures show higher conformity (Smith and Bond), so findings may not generalise - though Meeus and Raaijmakers (Netherlands) and Burger (2009, US replication finding 67.5% obedience for men) show the effects are fairly robust.
• Historical validity: society has changed; Burger's replication and the BBC Prison Study suggest the classic findings are partly period-specific, and modern replication is essential before applying them.
• Applications: research explains real phenomena - obedience in hierarchical organisations (military, healthcare), minority influence in campaigns (Suffragettes, recycling, energy conservation) and resistance programmes in schools - demonstrating the topic's practical value.

💡 Worked Example

❓ Practice Questions & Mark Schemes

🎬 Video Resources

• YouTube: AQA A-level psychology social influence Asch Milgram minority influence revision

📄 Past Papers & Exam Resources

• AQA A-Level Psychology (7182) - past papers and mark schemes (AQA website)
• Physics & Maths Tutor - Social Influence topic notes, past paper questions and model answers

🔗 Further Reading & Resources

• Simply Psychology - Milgram Obedience Experiment (Saul McLeod)
• Simply Psychology - Conformity and Asch's Line Experiment
• Physics & Maths Tutor - Psychology revision hub (notes, questions by topic)
• AQA - find past papers and mark schemes for Psychology 7182

🧠 Flashcards (Spaced Repetition)

📝 Exam Questions by Topic

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