Media
New media, ownership and control, representations of gender, ethnicity and age, audience effects and moral panics from Cohen to Jenkins, with globalisation debates and 30-mark essay technique for AQA 7192 and OCR H580.
New media, ownership and control, representations of gender, ethnicity and age, audience effects and moral panics from Cohen to Jenkins, with globalisation debates and 30-mark essay technique for AQA 7192 and OCR H580.
AQA 4.7, OCR H580 (Component 03) and Eduqas AC6.1 expect you to define new media as digital, interactive, on-demand media - user-generated content, convergence, portability, global reach. Jenkins (2006) frames this as convergence: technologies, industries and audiences merge, so the smartphone delivers print, broadcast and interactive content at once, and 'fans become producers' - a participatory culture where audiences co-create what they consume (Wikipedia, fan fiction, YouTube). Digital divide: access and use remain stratified by age (young 'digital natives' against excluded older users), class, income, rurality and disability, producing a digital underclass locked out of online services and opportunity.
AO3: the celebratory account has limits. Cornford & Robbins argue 'new' media is largely old media repackaged - the same conglomerates, advertising and commercial logics in new wrappers; interactive platforms still concentrate ownership (a handful of tech giants) and regulation struggles to keep pace. The strongest answers treat new media as an intensification of existing patterns of control, not a rupture - and note the divide itself shows structural inequality persisting into the digital age.
Deepening new media: its defining features are digitalisation (content reduced to data, so boundaries between media collapse), interactivity (users respond, comment and co-create), decentralisation (no single gatekeeper) and portability. Optimists (Jenkins) stress democratisation - audiences become participants; pessimists note the same platforms concentrate attention and profit. Prensky's 'digital natives' label the generational divide, but Ofcom data show it is classed as well as aged: income, skills and confidence produce the 'digital underclass', and the divide carries life chances (job applications, services, education). AO3: treating the divide as purely generational mistakes a structural inequality for a cohort effect - the strongest answers link it back to class and age stratification.
Murdock & Golding (1977) give the Marxist baseline: media are owned by a shrinking set of conglomerates whose profit motive and cross-ownership skew content towards elite interests; Miliband (1969) adds that media transmit ruling-class ideology, normalising inequality. Gramsci's hegemony refines this: domination works through consent - media renew the dominant worldview daily until it appears common sense - and can be contested by counter-hegemonic voices. Herman & Chomsky (1988) operationalise the claim with the propaganda model: five filters - ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak and ideology - systematically produce elite-friendly news without any conspiracy; studies of Iraq War coverage (Kovach-style sourcing biases) are the standard application.
Pluralists argue ownership does not equal control: audiences are sovereign - content must attract them or outlets die; competition, Ofcom regulation, professional values (impartiality norms) and editorial autonomy check owners; and the internet multiplies voices so no one worldview can dominate. Vertical integration may even raise output diversity. AO3: empirical judgement - concentration statistics (a few conglomerates dominate UK national press) and Herman & Chomsky's filters support control; the two-way web and citizen journalism support plurality. The strongest answers argue media give bounded choice: real plurality inside a commercial framework.
AO3: the control thesis also underplays audience agency - even if content is skewed, decoding is active (Hall 1973), so ideology must still be accepted, negotiated or resisted by viewers.
Deepening ownership: in the UK national press a handful of proprietors dominate circulation, and vertical integration (one company owning TV, print, film and platforms) multiplies their reach; Curran & Seaton document how ownership concentration narrowed the diversity of the press over the twentieth century. Regulation is the pluralist counterweight: Ofcom enforces impartiality rules for broadcasters, and press self-regulation (IPSO) - though critics note its weakness, a finding central to the Leveson Inquiry (2011-12). AO3: weigh the two empirically: concentration statistics and Herman & Chomsky's filters support control; competitive diversity, editorial autonomy and the two-way web support plurality. Jenkins' participatory culture cuts both ways - audiences produce content, but on platforms owned by a very few companies, so 'plurality of voices' sits on a 'monopoly of pipes'.
Gender: feminist research shows women are systematically mis-represented. Tuchman (1978) named this symbolic annihilation - women are absent, trivialised (confined to domestic and beauty roles) or condemned (portrayed as 'problem mothers'); Mulvey (1975) added the male gaze: mainstream imagery constructs women as passive objects of heterosexual male looking. Evidence: body-ideal imagery, women's under-representation as news experts and presenters of 'hard' news. Ethnicity: minorities are disproportionately stereotyped as criminal, exotic or dependent, or simply tokenised; Hall et al (1978) showed mugging coverage racialised black youth ('inferential racism' in Hall's later term), and Gilroy extends this to the 'war on terror' framing of Muslim identities. Age: children are represented as innocent and vulnerable (justifying protection and control), while the elderly are framed as frail, dependent or comic - Carrigan & Szmigin document their invisibility in advertising despite growing spending power.
AO3: representations matter because they feed back into identity and power: repeated imagery constructs stereotypes that audiences learn (link to labelling - Becker 1963). But the strongest answers note change over time: women's and minority representation has diversified, and social media let users self-represent, complicating the top-down model; and Gauntlett warns against reading media as straightforwardly reflective of social divisions rather than constructing them.
Deepening gender: Connell's hegemonic masculinity explains the male side: media construct an ideal masculinity (strength, dominance, success) against which men and boys are measured, marginalising other masculinities. Gauntlett (2008) argues representation has diversified - contemporary media offer a wider range of gender identities - which feminist critics read as surface change over persistent structure. Deepening ethnicity: Hall's inferential racism names racism embedded in imagery without explicit statements, and Van Dijk found news discourse systematically frames minorities as 'the problem'. Deepening age: children are constructed as innocent and at risk (justifying regulation and control), youth as a threat (Cohen's folk devils), and the elderly as frail or comic - Biggs notes invisibility grows with age. AO3: representations are constructed, not reflected - Gauntlett's methodological warning - and social media self-representation complicates the top-down model.
The audience-effect models form a historical sequence. Hypodermic syringe (Frankfurt School heritage): media inject powerful, uniform messages into passive audiences - applied to propaganda and violence, with Bandura's (1963) Bobo doll experiments its classic (laboratory) support. Two-step flow (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955): media reach 'opinion leaders' first, who interpret messages for others - audiences are social, not isolated. Uses and gratifications (Blumler & McQuail 1968; Katz et al 1974): the active audience uses media for surveillance, identity, relationships and diversion - power sits with the user. Encoding/decoding (Hall 1973): producers encode preferred meanings, but audiences decode them dominantly, in negotiated or oppositional readings - meaning is a struggle, not an injection.
Moral panics (Cohen 1972): studying the mods and rockers clashes, Cohen showed media exaggerate, predict and symbolise, creating 'folk devils' and a deviancy amplification spiral - more police, more arrests, more coverage - which confirmed the original panic. The panic defines folk devils, agents of control (police, courts, politicians) escalate, and the group is further marginalised; the process is a direct application of labelling theory (Becker 1963), and Cohen shows it often panics on behalf of moral entrepreneurs. AO3: McRobbie & Thornton (1995) note modern panics now come with counter-panics and the target group's own media response.
Globalisation: media flows cross borders. Cultural imperialism (US dominance; Sklair's culture-ideology of consumerism) argues global media export one homogenised, consumerist worldview; Tomlinson counters with hybridisation - local cultures appropriate and rework global content - and McLuhan's 'global village' frames shared instant communication. Ritzer's McDonaldisation names the efficiency-and-standardisation logic spreading through global media. AO3: new media accelerate these flows and enable citizen journalism, but conglomerate ownership of the pipes keeps the control debate alive - the A* judgement weighs cultural homogenisation against evidence of hybrid local reception.
Deepening the models: the hypodermic syringe's historical setting matters: inter-war propaganda and Frankfurt School fears of mass society shaped it; its weakness is assuming a uniform, passive audience. Two-step flow (Katz & Lazarsfeld's personal influence study of the 1940s Erie County election) showed personal networks mediate media - but influence still flows one way from leaders. Uses and gratifications reverses the arrow but is criticised as tautological (we use media because we are gratified) and hard to test. Encoding/decoding (Hall's account of TV discourse) shows meaning is a struggle between producer and audience. Deepening globalisation: cultural pessimists see homogenisation - 'coca-colonisation'; optimists see hybrid local reception and a global public sphere. AO3: new media accelerate both flows and fragmentation; the strongest judgement weighs audience activity (uses and gratifications; encoding/decoding) against structural power (ownership; moral-panic amplification through social media).
Exam technique: media questions reward weighing models against evidence, not listing them. AQA 4.7 and OCR H580 give 30-mark 'outline and evaluate' essays (AO weighting roughly 8/8/14) and 10-mark 'outline and analyse two' items; OCR also sets 'assess the view that...' with an Item (e.g. Item: most young people get their news from social media). The A* skeleton: define the key concepts (new media, hegemony, moral panic; hypodermic syringe, two-step flow, uses and gratifications), deploy two or three competing perspectives each with a named study, evaluate each with a counter-theorist or counter-evidence, and finish with a weighed judgement answering the actual question - e.g. 'media power is real but bounded: content is concentrated and amplified, yet audiences decode actively and platforms give counter-voices space'.