amazon.co.ukNatural Law and Situation Ethics
Aquinas' Natural Law (primary precepts, double effect) and Fletcher's situation ethics (agape, four working principles) compared - strengths, weaknesses and A* essay technique for AQA 7062 and OCR H573.
🎯 Learning Objectives
- Explain Aquinas' Natural Law: telos, primary and secondary precepts, real vs apparent goods, interior vs exterior acts (AO1)
- Explain the doctrine of double effect and apply it to a case (ectopic pregnancy) (AO1)
- Explain Fletcher's situation ethics: four working principles, six propositions and agape (AO1)
- Compare Natural Law and situation ethics as legalistic vs antinomian extremes with situation ethics between (AO2)
- Evaluate strengths and weaknesses of both, including Hume's is-ought gap and the objection that 'natural' does not entail 'good' (AO2)
- Write an evaluative essay with a sustained argument and justified verdict (AO2/AO3)
📋 Key Definitions and Core Concepts
natural law: Aquinas' deontological theory: human nature has a telos (union with God) knowable by reason; precepts derived from that telos are objective and universal.
telos: The end or purpose of a thing; for Aquinas the telos of human nature is eudaimonia and ultimately union with God.
primary precepts: Aquinas' five fundamental purposes of human nature: worship God, reproduce, live in an ordered society, learn, defend the innocent (self-preservation).
secondary precepts: Rules derived from the primary precepts by reason (do not steal, do not abort) - they guide action and can be refined for circumstance.
real vs apparent goods: Aquinas: a real good accords with human nature's telos; an apparent good (e.g. adultery) seems desirable but leads away from the telos; wrongdoing is error of reason.
interior and exterior acts: Aquinas: the interior act (intention) and exterior act (action done) must both be good for an act to be morally good; helping a neighbour for reward has a good exterior but bad interior act.
doctrine of double effect: It can be permissible to perform a good act with a foreseen but unintended bad effect if the intention is good, the bad effect is not the means to the good, and the good is proportionate.
situation ethics: Fletcher's theory: only one rule is absolute - agape (selfless love); each situation is decided by what love requires, rejecting fixed rules.
four working principles: Fletcher's methodology: pragmatism (workable), relativism (no fixed rules), positivism (love is willed, not reasoned from nature), personalism (people before rules).
agape: Unconditional, selfless Christian love (Greek agape); the only intrinsic good in Fletcher's theory - 'love your neighbour as yourself' applied universally.
legalism vs antinomianism: Fletcher's two rejected extremes: legalism (fixed rules govern decisions) and antinomianism (no principles at all); situation ethics sits between them.
Aquinas' Natural Law: telos, precepts and goods
Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I-II.94): the theory rests on a telos in human nature: all things are directed to ends; human nature's end is eudaimonia (flourishing) and ultimately union with God. This telos is knowable by reason, not revelation alone - 'the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil... is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light' (participation in the eternal law). Spec: AQA 7062/1A section 3.2.1.1; OCR H573/02.
Primary precepts - five fundamental purposes written into human nature: (1) worship God, (2) reproduce, (3) live in an ordered society, (4) learn, (5) defend the innocent/self-preservation. Secondary precepts - rules derived from these by reason: do not steal, do not abort, keep promises; they are refinements that guide action. The structure: eternal law (God's rational order) - divine law (revealed) - natural law (human participation) - human law (civil).
Real vs apparent goods: wrongdoing is an error of reason - a person who commits adultery pursues an apparent good (pleasure) that leads away from the telos; no one knowingly chooses evil. Interior and exterior acts: both intention and action must be good; giving to charity for reputation has a good exterior act but a bad interior act, so the act lacks moral worth. Casuistry: applying precepts case by case (e.g. is this lie permissible?) - though Aquinas' casuistry remains rule-governed.
NL in Catholic teaching: Vatican I reaffirms that God can be known and the moral law discerned by natural reason; Humanae Vitae (1968) applies NL to contraception - each marital act must remain open to procreation; the ordered-society precept grounds Catholic social teaching (just wage, Rerum Novarum). The four levels of law in full: eternal law (God's rational ordering of the universe) - divine law (revealed scripture, needed because reason is fallible) - natural law (human participation in the eternal law) - human law (civil law derived from natural law). Casuistry in full: NL supports case-by-case application through secondary precepts - e.g. is this lie permissible? (Aquinas: lies are always wrong); is this killing permissible? (double effect decides).
Doctrine of double effect and later developments
Doctrine of double effect: it can be permissible to perform a good act knowing it will have a bad side-effect, provided: (1) the act itself is good or neutral; (2) the agent intends only the good effect (the bad effect is foreseen but not intended); (3) the bad effect is not the means to the good effect; (4) the good effect is proportionate to the bad. Application: ectopic pregnancy - removing the damaged tube (good or neutral act) foreseeably ends the foetus, but the bad effect is not the means; abortion directly intended to end the foetus would be impermissible. Other applications: self-defence (killing an aggressor unintended), palliative sedation, bombing in war (military target with civilian deaths foreseen but unintended).
Critique: the intention condition is psychologically slippery - did the agent really not intend the bad effect?; some say the distinction between intended and foreseen is morally arbitrary (the foetus dies either way). Defence: intention is morally central - a surgeon's intent differs from a bomber's even where outcomes match; the doctrine resolves conflicts without condoning intended evil.
- Proportionalism (Hoose, Knauer, Fuchs): a Catholic development - in real conflicts of precepts, one may act to produce a proportionately greater good; 'ontic evil' in acts may be tolerated if proportionate; this softens NL rigidity and is debated in Catholic ethics.
- Finnis (Natural Law and Natural Rights, 1980): secular restatement - seven basic goods (life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, religion) knowable by reason without theological grounding.
Self-defence in full: killing an aggressor in self-defence is permissible if the intention is to repel the attack, not to kill; proportionality limits it. Finnis' seven basic goods in full (Natural Law and Natural Rights, 1980): life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion ('transcendental' goods knowable by practical reason without theological premises); Finnis' restatement answers the secular objection to Aquinas' telos but multiplies goods, so conflicts are harder to resolve - a standard AO2 point.
Fletcher's situation ethics: agape and the four working principles
Fletcher (Situation Ethics, 1966): rejects two extremes: legalism (fixed rules govern every decision) and antinomianism (no principles at all, pure spontaneity). Situation ethics sits between: one absolute rule - agape - applied flexibly to each situation. Spec: AQA 7062/1A section 3.2.1.2; OCR H573/02.
Four working principles: (1) pragmatism - the course of action must be workable, not theoretical; (2) relativism - no fixed rules; 'it depends' is the whole of the situation; (3) positivism - love is a matter of faith and will, not derived by reason from nature; (4) personalism - people, not rules or things, come first: 'the situationist avoids words like never and perfect and always'. Six propositions: (1) only love is intrinsically good; (2) love is the only norm (love replaces rules); (3) love and justice are the same (justice is love distributed); (4) love is not liking; (5) love justifies the means (only the end can justify the means - love's end); (6) love decides situationally (there are no fixed categories).
Applications: extramarital affair to save a marriage (love may require it); stealing medicine for a dying spouse (love justifies theft); abortion where the pregnancy threatens the mother's life. Fletcher's own examples: the middle-aged mother in a prisoner-of-war camp, and Mrs Bergmeier. Strengths: flexible and person-centred; fits Jesus' teaching on love over law (Sabbath healing, woman taken in adultery); avoids both rigidity and chaos. Weaknesses: agape is undefined and unmeasurable - 'what does love require?' admits conflicting answers; it may license almost anything (Fletcher's own provocations); love as the only norm is secularised in practice; critics say it collapses into act utilitarianism with a religious label.
Fletcher's examples in full: Mrs Bergmeier - a German woman in a Russian POW camp deliberately becomes pregnant by a camp guard so she is released to her family; Fletcher argues love justified the act. The middle-aged mother - a POW camp mother who contracted syphilis from guards could have an abortion to avoid infecting her husband: Fletcher argues love, not the rule against abortion, decides. Agape and Jesus' teaching in full: 'love your enemies' (Matthew 5:44); the Sabbath healing (Mark 2-3) and the woman taken in adultery (John 8) show Jesus setting love over law - Fletcher's biblical warrant. Critique in full: the six propositions may collapse into one ('do the loving thing'); Paul Lehmann and James Gustafson questioned whether agape can be operationalised without rules - the standard AO2 point.
Comparison and religious perspectives
Natural law vs situation ethics: NL is deontological and rule-based (fixed precepts from human nature's telos); Fletcher's theory is teleological in method (ends decided per situation) with one absolute (agape). NL grounds morality in nature and reason; Fletcher in faith and will (positivism). NL supports double effect and fixed secondary precepts (against contraception, abortion); Fletcher permits both where love requires. Judgement patterns for A*: NL is objective and protects the innocent, but 'natural' does not entail 'good' (Hume's is-ought gap) and rigid precepts can produce harmful outcomes; Fletcher's theory is flexible and person-centred, but agape is undefined and the theory risks collapsing into utilitarianism.
Religious perspectives: Catholic tradition endorses NL (Vatican II, Humanae Vitae) - reason participates in the divine law; Protestant thinkers (Barth, Brunner) reject natural theology - morality comes from revelation and agape, not nature, which supports Fletcher's direction. Bonhoeffer: ethics is not about principles but about responsible action in concrete situations - his responsibility ethics anticipates Fletcher's flexibility while remaining theocentric. Robinson (Honest to God, 1963): popularised Fletcher's situational agape for a modern church - 'the new morality'. Vardy: agape remains a Christian ideal that secular versions cannot capture.
Weighing point: the decisive questions are (1) whether fixed precepts or situational love better protect people; (2) whether morality can be grounded in nature (NL) at all in a secular age; (3) whether agape is precise enough to guide decisions - A* essays must weigh, not list.
Bonhoeffer in full: Ethics (unfinished) - ethics is not about principles but about responsible action in concrete situations; 'responsible action' weighs the concrete reality, not abstract rules - anticipating Fletcher's flexibility while remaining theocentric. Robinson in full: Honest to God (1963) popularised Fletcher and Tillich for a lay audience - 'the new morality'; the church establishment reaction (1963 controversy) shows how radical the situational agape was received as being.
Exam technique: applications and pitfalls
Exam structure: AQA 7062 Paper 1 Section B: each question = 25 marks - 10-mark AO1 'Explain...' then 15-mark AO2 'Critically discuss...'; two questions answered. OCR H573/02: extended 'Critically discuss' essays plus AO1 components. Applications to have ready: euthanasia (double effect vs agape), abortion (ectopic pregnancy case), sexual ethics (contraception, premarital sex, homosexuality - NL fixed precepts vs Fletcher's love), business (just wage - NL; honest dealing - Fletcher's person-centred agape).
- Command words: 'Explain' = accurate AO1 with the five primary precepts and four working principles named; 'Critically discuss' = sustained argument with verdict.
- Pitfalls: confusing primary and secondary precepts (five purposes vs derived rules); treating double effect as permitting intended harm (it must be unintended); saying Fletcher has 'no rules' (one absolute: agape - plus four working principles); missing Fletcher's positivism (love is willed, not reasoned) - the standard AO1 differentiator; presenting NL as purely religious (Aquinas grounds it in reason - Vatican I); ignoring Hume's is-ought gap; asserting 'natural = good' without defence.
- Examiner tips: memorise the five primary precepts and the four working principles as lists; quote 'never' and 'perfect' and 'always' (Fletcher) and 'the light of natural reason' (Aquinas); use the ectopic pregnancy as the double-effect case; name Bonhoeffer and Robinson for religious support of agape; use Hume's is-ought gap as the sharpest NL critique; end with a justified verdict - e.g. Fletcher better protects people but NL better secures objectivity, so the choice depends on whether morality is grounded in nature or revelation.
💡 Worked Example
Exam-style: 'Situation ethics is more convincing than Natural Law for moral decision-making.' Critically discuss this claim. [AQA 7062 15-mark AO2 essay / OCR H573 extended essay]
Mark-scheme logic: AO1 required: Aquinas' Natural Law (telos, five primary precepts, secondary precepts, real vs apparent goods, double effect); Fletcher's situation ethics (four working principles, six propositions, agape); contrast legalism/antinomianism. AO2 required: (1) NL strengths - objective, universal precepts protect the innocent; double effect resolves conflicts (ectopic pregnancy); (2) NL weaknesses - 'natural' does not entail 'good' (Hume's is-ought gap); rigid precepts produce harmful outcomes; telos is contested in a secular age; (3) situation ethics strengths - flexible, person-centred, fits Jesus' love over law; (4) weaknesses - agape is undefined and may license anything; collapses into act utilitarianism with a religious label; (5) weigh - Fletcher better fits dilemmas, NL better secures objectivity; conclude with a justified verdict grounded in whether morality is grounded in nature or love.
❓ Practice Questions & Mark Schemes
Explain Aquinas' primary precepts and how secondary precepts are derived. [10 marks AO1]
Answer: AO1 answer: Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I-II.94) - human nature has a telos (flourishing and union with God) knowable by reason, participating in the eternal law. Five primary precepts written into human nature: worship God, reproduce, live in an ordered society, learn, defend the innocent (self-preservation). Secondary precepts are derived from these by reason: do not steal, do not abort, keep promises - refinements that guide action. The structure: eternal law (God's rational order) - divine law (revealed) - natural law (human participation) - human law (civil). Marks awarded for: the telos, all five primary precepts named, the derivation by reason, and the four-law structure.
'Natural Law provides a convincing approach to moral decision-making.' Critically discuss. [15 marks AO2]
Answer: AO1 anchor: primary precepts, secondary precepts, real vs apparent goods, double effect. AO2 required: (1) strengths - objective, universal precepts transcend culture and emotion; protects the innocent; double effect resolves conflicts (ectopic pregnancy); (2) Hume's is-ought gap - deriving 'ought' from observations of human nature is logically invalid; 'natural' does not entail 'good'; (3) rigid secondary precepts (against contraception) can produce harmful outcomes utilitarians would condemn; the telos is contested in a secular age; (4) proportionalism (Hoose) - softens rigidity by allowing proportionate exceptions; (5) religious support - Vatican I: God's existence and moral law knowable by natural reason; Protestant objection (Barth): morality from revelation, not nature; (6) weigh and conclude with a justified verdict, e.g. convincing for those accepting its premises (telos, reason) but contested as a universal ethic - the is-ought gap is the sharpest critique.
Explain the doctrine of double effect and one application. [10 marks AO1]
Answer: AO1 answer: it can be permissible to perform a good act knowing it will have a bad side-effect, provided: (1) the act itself is good or neutral; (2) the agent intends only the good effect (the bad effect is foreseen but not intended); (3) the bad effect is not the means to the good effect; (4) the good effect is proportionate to the bad. Application: ectopic pregnancy - removing the damaged tube foreseeably ends the foetus, but the bad effect is not the means, so the act is permissible; direct abortion intended to end the foetus would not be. Other applications: self-defence, palliative sedation, bombing a military target with foreseen civilian deaths. Marks awarded for: all four conditions, and one accurate application distinguishing intended from foreseen effects.
'Fletcher's situation ethics is just utilitarianism with a religious label.' Critically discuss. [15 marks AO2]
Answer: AO1 anchor: Fletcher (Situation Ethics, 1966) - four working principles (pragmatism, relativism, positivism, personalism), six propositions, agape as the only absolute. AO2 required: (1) similarity - one maxim applied flexibly per situation; love justifies the means; relativism resembles act utilitarianism's flexibility; both person-centred in practice; (2) differences - agape is selfless love of neighbour, not hedonic pleasure (Bentham) or even higher pleasure (Mill); positivism: love is willed by faith, not calculated; religious grounding in Jesus' love-over-law teaching; (3) collapse objection - without measurable content, agape functions as 'whatever works', collapsing into act utilitarianism; (4) defence - the source of the maxim matters morally: agape is other-regarding and absolute, which utilitarianism lacks; (5) weigh - methodologically similar, foundationally different; conclude with a justified verdict, e.g. the label is unfair - agape's source and absoluteness distinguish it, though the collapse objection shows the difference is fragile in practice.
Explain Fletcher's four working principles and six propositions. [10 marks AO1]
Answer: AO1 answer: Fletcher rejects legalism (fixed rules) and antinomianism (no principles); situation ethics sits between. Four working principles: (1) pragmatism - the course of action must be workable; (2) relativism - no fixed rules, 'it depends'; (3) positivism - love is a matter of faith and will, not derived by reason from nature; (4) personalism - people, not rules or things, come first. Six propositions: (1) only love is intrinsically good; (2) love is the only norm; (3) love and justice are the same; (4) love is not liking; (5) love justifies the means; (6) love decides situationally - there are no fixed categories. Marks awarded for: all four principles and all six propositions named accurately, and the legalism/antinomianism contrast.
''Natural' does not entail 'good'.' Critically assess this objection to Natural Law. [15 marks AO2]
Answer: AO1 anchor: Hume's is-ought gap - deriving moral conclusions from facts about human nature is logically invalid; Aquinas moves from the telos of human nature to precepts. AO2 required: (1) strength - the gap is decisive against reading 'natural' as authoritative: natural behaviours (aggression, disease) are not thereby good; the reproduction precept assumes nature's telos without justification; (2) Aquinas' reply - the telos is not statistical 'naturalness' but the purpose written into human nature by God, known by reason; unnatural = contrary to purpose, not merely unusual; (3) Finnis - a secular restatement grounds basic goods in practical reason without theological premises, answering the gap differently; (4) proportionalism - even if precepts conflict, proportionate goods guide action; (5) weigh - the objection bites against crudely naturalistic versions but not against Aquinas' teleological or Finnis' reason-based versions; conclude with a justified verdict, e.g. 'natural = good' is invalid, but Aquinas' claim is 'purposeful = good', which survives if the telos is granted.