amazon.co.ukReligious Language
Verification and falsification (Ayer, Flew, Hare, Mitchell, Hick), analogy (Aquinas, Ramsey), symbol (Tillich), via negativa and language games (Wittgenstein) - spec-precise revision for OCR H573, WJEC/Eduqas and CCEA.
🎯 Learning Objectives
- Distinguish cognitive and non-cognitive uses of religious language (AO1)
- Reproduce the verification principle (Ayer) and Flew's falsification challenge, with Hare's bliks, Mitchell's partisan and Hick's eschatological verification as responses (AO1/AO2)
- Explain Aquinas' doctrine of analogy (attribution and proportion) and Ramsey's models and qualifiers (AO1)
- Set out Tillich's view of religious symbols (participation in the divine) and its critiques (AO1/AO2)
- Explain the via negativa (Pseudo-Dionysius, Maimonides) and its strengths and weaknesses (AO1/AO2)
- Explain Wittgenstein's language games and D.Z. Phillips' non-realism, and evaluate all approaches comparatively (AO2)
- Write an evaluative essay with a sustained argument and justified verdict (AO2/AO3)
📋 Key Definitions and Core Concepts
cognitive language: Language that asserts facts and can be true or false (realist religious language: 'God exists' reports a reality).
non-cognitive language: Language that expresses attitudes, commitments or ways of living rather than facts, so truth/falsity does not apply (Hare, Phillips, Wittgenstein).
verification principle: Ayer: a statement is meaningful only if analytic or empirically verifiable in principle; religious claims fail both tests and are meaningless.
falsification principle: Flew: a statement is meaningful only if some conceivable observation would count against it; religious believers allow nothing to count against 'God loves us', so the claim dies 'the death of a thousand qualifications'.
eschatological verification: Hick: religious claims are verifiable in principle - after death (if it occurs) the believer will 'see' God, so 'God exists' has a checkable condition, unlike Flew's examples.
blik: Hare's term for an unfalsifiable frame of mind or worldview (the paranoid student's blik); such bliks are not meaningless - they structure interpretation of evidence.
analogy of attribution: Aquinas: terms apply to God and creatures because God is the cause of creaturely perfections - 'God is good' because God causes goodness in creatures.
analogy of proportion: Aquinas: terms apply to God and creatures in proportion to their natures - God's goodness is infinite as God's nature is infinite, as a dog's health is proportionate to a dog.
via negativa: The apophatic way: God can only be described by what he is not, since positive language is anthropomorphic and inadequate (Pseudo-Dionysius, Maimonides).
religious symbol: Tillich: a symbol participates in the reality it points to, opens levels of reality otherwise closed, and cannot be replaced - unlike signs, which merely point.
Verification and falsification: the logical positivists and the replies
Cognitive vs non-cognitive: realists hold 'God loves us' asserts a fact that could be true or false; non-realists hold religious language expresses commitment, not facts. Spec: OCR H573/01; WJEC/Eduqas Component 1; CCEA AS.
Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936): the verification principle - a statement is meaningful only if (1) analytic (true by definition) or (2) empirically verifiable at least in principle. 'God exists' and 'God loves us' pass neither test: they are not tautologies and no observation could verify them - so religious language is not false but meaningless. Standard critique: the principle fails its own test (it is neither analytic nor empirically verifiable); Ayer's strong version was abandoned, and even his revised weak version does not defeat all religious claims.
Flew ('Theology and Falsification', 1950): the gardener parable - the explorer and the sceptic: the invisible, intangible, scentless gardener 'dies the death of a thousand qualifications'. God's love behaves exactly like non-love (childhood cancer, suffering), and believers qualify everything away ('God's love is not human love', 'his ways are higher'). Flew: if nothing could count against a claim, it asserts nothing. Replies:
- Hare: bliks - the paranoid student sees dons plotting murder; no evidence would change his blik, but the blik is not meaningless, it structures how all evidence is interpreted; religious commitment is a sane blik, not a false assertion. Critics: if bliks are not true or false, the realist question is dodged, not answered.
- Mitchell: the partisan - the resistance fighter meets a stranger who says 'trust me', then witnesses him aiding both sides and neither; he still trusts. Faith is trust held against evidence, not blind assertion; but Mitchell concedes the evidence genuinely counts against God - which Flew denies believers do.
- Hick: eschatological verification - 'God exists' is verifiable after death if it occurs; the claim has a checkable condition, unlike the gardener's qualifications. Critique: it verifies survival, not God, and depends on the afterlife being real.
Verification and experience crossover: Ayer's principle would also render reports of religious experience meaningless - the standard link to the religious experience topic; Hick's eschatological verification restores checkability to both claims. Crombie's eschatological parables (New Essays in Philosophical Theology, 1955) - religious statements are meaningful as parables whose point is fully grasped only in the eschaton - a further structured reply to Flew.
Analogy and symbol: Aquinas, Ramsey and Tillich
Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I.13): religious language is neither univocal (same meaning - God is 'good' as a person is good: anthropomorphism) nor equivocal (completely different meaning - then nothing is said of God). It is analogical. Analogy of attribution: terms apply to God as cause of creaturely perfections - 'God is good' because God causes goodness in creatures, as 'the food is healthy' because it causes health. Analogy of proportion: terms apply in proportion to each nature - God's goodness is infinite as God's nature is infinite, as a dog's health is proportionate to a dog's nature. Strengths: preserves meaningful talk of God without anthropomorphism; philosophically careful. Weaknesses: it is unclear how far the analogy stretches; critics say we still do not know what 'God is good' actually asserts.
Ramsey (Religious Language, 1957): religious language uses models (positive terms like 'Father', 'good') and qualifiers ('infinitely', 'wholly') that stretch the model to divine scale; the qualifier prevents the anthropomorphic misreading. This is a modern restatement of proportion.
Tillich (Dynamics of Faith, 1957): religious language is symbolic. A symbol (1) points to something beyond itself, (2) participates in the reality it symbolises (the flag participates in the nation's power), (3) opens levels of reality otherwise closed, (4) cannot be replaced by anything else, (5) grows and dies with the culture. 'God is our rock' participates in divine steadfastness. Standard critique: participation is mysterious - if symbols are non-cognitive, how can 'God is love' assert anything true? Tillich's own treatment of 'God is being-itself' edges toward saying something literal, which complicates his account.
Via negativa and language games
Via negativa (apophatic way): Pseudo-Dionysius (Mystical Theology) - God is beyond all affirmation; we ascend to him by negations, stripping away anthropomorphic terms; Maimonides (Guide for the Perplexed) - positive statements about God risk idolatry; 'God is not in space' tells us more reliably than 'God is spirit'. Strengths: avoids anthropomorphism; fits James' ineffability and Otto's wholly other; protects divine transcendence. Weaknesses: it may say nothing at all (negations without any positive content leave us with no concept of God); it conflicts with positive biblical language ('God is love', 'the Lord is my shepherd') and with worship and prayer, which address God positively; Brian Davies' critique - a negation is only informative against a background of positive understanding.
Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations; Lectures on Religious Belief): language is a set of language games governed by forms of life - meaning is use within a practice; 'God exists' is meaningful within the religious language game, and its criteria of sense are internal to that game (not the scientific game). Religious statements do not function as hypotheses; they express pictures governing a way of life. D.Z. Phillips (non-realism): 'God exists' is not a report of an external being but expresses a form of life - prayer, worship, moral commitment; the realist question 'does God exist?' misfires. Standard critiques: (1) it makes religion immune from criticism - believers in any game are right by definition, which seems to license anything; (2) it conflicts with believers' own self-understanding - most believers take 'God exists' realistically; (3) if games are incommensurable, cross-game truth claims (mission, apologetics) become unintelligible.
Comparative judgement: verificationism is decisively self-defeating; Flew's falsification challenge is the sharpest attack on realist religious language; analogy and via negativa preserve meaningful God-talk but may say too little; language games preserve meaningfulness but at the cost of immunity from critique. A* essays weigh these trade-offs and argue for a position.
Evaluation and exam technique
Spec coverage: OCR H573/01 (religious language: cognitive/non-cognitive, verification and falsification, via negativa, analogy, symbol, 20th-century perspectives); WJEC/Eduqas Component 1 (religious language); CCEA AS (religious language). AQA 7062 has no dedicated religious language topic, but verification/falsification arguments cross into the religious experience discussion.
Command words and structure: OCR extended essays ('Critically discuss whether religious language is meaningful'); WJEC/Eduqas AO1/AO2 essay questions; CCEA structured questions. Plan: (1) frame cognitive vs non-cognitive; (2) sharpest challenge (verification or falsification); (3) the best reply (Hick, analogy or language games); (4) weigh trade-offs; (5) verdict.
- Pitfalls: saying Ayer's principle makes religion 'false' (it makes it meaningless - a different claim); confusing Hare's blik with Mitchell's partisan (blik = worldview; partisan = trust against evidence); presenting Tillich's symbols as merely signs; treating Wittgenstein as a realist; forgetting the verification principle is self-defeating - the single most rewarded critique; giving no verdict.
- Examiner tips: memorise the parables (gardener, dons, partisan) with their authors; quote 'dies the death of a thousand qualifications'; contrast univocal, equivocal, analogical explicitly; use Hick's eschatological verification as the structured reply; name Pseudo-Dionysius and Maimonides for via negativa; end with a justified verdict on which account best secures meaningful God-talk.
Perceptual model, non-realism and comparative verdicts
Alston (Perceiving God, 1991): Christian mystical practice is a socially established doxastic practice - God is experienced as an external object, analogically to sense perception; beliefs formed in socially established, coherent, self-supportive practices are prima facie justified. Reply: rival practices (Buddhist, Hindu) are equally established, so Alston's epistemic conservatism limits the inference to one God; Alston concedes this and argues theism is better supported than rivals, not that rivals are meaningless.
Crombie (in Flew and MacIntyre, New Essays in Philosophical Theology, 1955): religious statements are eschatological parables - meaningful as stories whose point is only fully grasped in the eschaton; like Hick, Crombie gives religious language a deferred but real sense.
Cupitt (Taking Leave of God, 1980): non-realism - God is a spiritual ideal, not an objective being; religious language expresses human values and commitments ('God' = the sum of our spiritual ideals); the realist question 'does God exist?' is the wrong question. Critique: Cupitt's non-realism cannot account for prayer as petition to a real other, and most believers reject it as atheism in religious dress.
Comparative verdicts for A*: (1) verificationism is self-defeating - it cannot be the standard; (2) Flew's falsification challenge is the sharpest attack on realist religious language, and Hick's eschatological verification plus Mitchell's partisan are the strongest structured replies; (3) analogy (Aquinas) is the strongest realist account of how God-talk is meaningful, but it may say too little; (4) language games and non-realism preserve meaningfulness by relocating it - at the cost of immunity from critique and conflict with believers' self-understanding; (5) weigh these trade-offs and argue for one position: e.g. religious language is meaningful analogically and non-cognitively in different uses, while verificationism fails on its own terms.
Exam technique additions: OCR H573/01 also expects the connection between religious language and God's nature (omnipotence, omnibenelevance) - e.g. if 'God is good' is analogical, what does divine goodness mean for the problem of evil? AQA answers on religious experience should note the verification angle (Ayer) and Hick's eschatological verification as the crossover point.
Final revision anchor: for OCR essays, pair one cognitive account (analogy or eschatological verification) with one non-cognitive account (language games or Tillich's symbols) in every answer - the mark scheme rewards coverage of both sides of the cognitive/non-cognitive divide.
💡 Worked Example
Exam-style: 'Religious language is meaningful.' Critically assess this claim with reference to verification and falsification. [OCR H573 extended essay / WJEC/Eduqas essay]
Mark-scheme logic: AO1 required: cognitive vs non-cognitive distinction; Ayer's verification principle; Flew's falsification principle with the gardener parable; replies - Hare's bliks, Mitchell's partisan, Hick's eschatological verification; optionally analogy (Aquinas), Tillich's symbols, via negativa and Wittgenstein's language games. AO2 required: (1) the verification principle is self-defeating - it fails its own test, so it cannot rule out religious language; (2) Flew's challenge is sharper: believers qualify claims until nothing is asserted; (3) Hare and Mitchell show unfalsifiable bliks and trust against evidence are not meaningless, but they dodge the realist question; (4) Hick gives a checkable condition, though it verifies survival not God; (5) analogy and via negativa preserve meaning but may say too little; (6) weigh - e.g. religious language is meaningful analogically or as language games, but verificationism fails on its own terms; conclude with a justified verdict.
❓ Practice Questions & Mark Schemes
Explain the verification principle and its application to religious language. [10 marks AO1]
Answer: AO1 answer: Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936) - a statement is meaningful only if (1) analytic (true by definition) or (2) empirically verifiable at least in principle. 'God exists' and 'God loves us' pass neither test: they are not tautologies and no observation could verify them - so religious language is not false but meaningless. Distinguish cognitive (fact-asserting) from non-cognitive (attitude-expressing) uses. Marks awarded for: the two conditions of the principle, the meaning-not-falsity point, and the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction.
'Religious language is meaningless.' Critically discuss. [15 marks AO2]
Answer: AO1 anchor: verificationism (Ayer), falsification (Flew), replies (Hare, Mitchell, Hick), analogy (Aquinas), language games (Wittgenstein). AO2 required: (1) the verification principle is self-defeating - it fails its own test, so it cannot rule out religious language; (2) Flew's challenge is sharper - believers qualify claims ('God's love is not human love') until nothing is asserted; (3) Hare - bliks are unfalsifiable but not meaningless, they structure interpretation; Mitchell - faith is trust held against evidence, and the evidence genuinely counts against God; (4) Hick - eschatological verification gives 'God exists' a checkable condition; (5) analogy and via negativa preserve meaningful God-talk; language games make it meaningful within a form of life; (6) weigh - e.g. religious language is meaningful analogically or as language games, while verificationism fails on its own terms; conclude with a justified verdict.
Explain Flew's falsification challenge and the responses of Hare, Mitchell and Hick. [10 marks AO1]
Answer: AO1 answer: Flew ('Theology and Falsification', 1950) - the gardener parable: the invisible, intangible, scentless gardener 'dies the death of a thousand qualifications'; God's love behaves exactly like non-love, and believers qualify everything away - if nothing could count against a claim, it asserts nothing. Hare: bliks - the paranoid student's unfalsifiable frame of mind is not meaningless, it structures interpretation of all evidence; religious commitment is a sane blik. Mitchell: the partisan - the resistance fighter trusts the stranger despite evidence against him; faith is trust held against evidence, not blind assertion - and the evidence genuinely counts. Hick: eschatological verification - 'God exists' is verifiable after death if it occurs, so the claim has a checkable condition. Marks awarded for: the parable and 'thousand qualifications', all three responses accurately distinguished.
'Analogy is the best account of religious language.' Critically assess. [15 marks AO2]
Answer: AO1 anchor: Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I.13) - religious language is neither univocal (anthropomorphic) nor equivocal (says nothing) but analogical: analogy of attribution (God causes creaturely perfections - 'the food is healthy') and of proportion (terms apply in proportion to each nature - God's goodness is infinite as God's nature is infinite); Ramsey's models and qualifiers. AO2 required: (1) strengths - preserves meaningful talk without anthropomorphism; philosophically careful; avoids the extremes; (2) weaknesses - unclear how far the analogy stretches; we still do not know what 'God is good' asserts; via negativa may better protect transcendence; (3) language games - meaningfulness within a form of life, but immune from critique; (4) verificationism - self-defeating, so the realist question stands; (5) weigh - analogy is the strongest realist account but may say too little; conclude with a justified verdict, e.g. analogy is best among realist options, though Wittgenstein's approach answers a different question entirely.
Explain the via negativa and its main weakness. [10 marks AO1]
Answer: AO1 answer: the apophatic way - Pseudo-Dionysius (Mystical Theology): God is beyond all affirmation; we ascend to him by negations, stripping away anthropomorphic terms. Maimonides (Guide for the Perplexed): positive statements about God risk idolatry; 'God is not in space' is more reliable than 'God is spirit'. Main weakness: it may say nothing at all - negations without positive content leave us with no concept of God; Brian Davies - a negation is only informative against a background of positive understanding; it also conflicts with positive biblical language ('God is love') and worship. Marks awarded for: Pseudo-Dionysius and Maimonides accurately cited, the anthropomorphism rationale, and the Davies-style emptiness critique.
'Wittgenstein's language games make religious language immune from criticism.' Critically discuss. [15 marks AO2]
Answer: AO1 anchor: Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations; Lectures on Religious Belief) - meaning is use within a language game governed by a form of life; 'God exists' is meaningful within the religious game, whose criteria of sense are internal to it; religious statements function as pictures governing a way of life; D.Z. Phillips' non-realism. AO2 required: (1) strength - the account fits how believers actually use language (prayer, worship, commitment) and dissolves the verificationist challenge; (2) immunity critique - if games are incommensurable, believers in any game are right by definition, which licenses anything and blocks cross-game criticism; (3) it conflicts with believers' own self-understanding - most believers take 'God exists' realistically, so the non-realist reading misdescribes faith; (4) Flew's challenge returns within the game - religious claims still function like assertions in many contexts; (5) weigh - the account explains religious language but at the cost of immunity from critique; conclude with a justified verdict, e.g. language games dissolve the wrong problem - the realist question stands, so the immunity cost outweighs the gain.