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Religious Experience and Miracles
Year 1 / ASYear 2 / A-LevelAQA, OCR, WJEC/Eduqas, CCEA
Types of religious experience (James, Stace, Otto), Swinburne's credulity, challenges from Freud and Jung, and Hume's and Wiles' critiques of miracles - revision notes and A* essay technique for AQA 7062 and OCR H573.
🎯 Learning Objectives
Classify types of religious experience (visions, voices, numinous, mystical, corporate) with James' four qualities and Stace's distinction (AO1)
Explain Swinburne's principles of credulity and testimony as the main argument from experience to God (AO1)
Set out the challenges from Freud (wish-fulfilment), Jung (collective unconscious) and Feuerbach (projection) (AO1/AO2)
Reproduce Hume's definition of miracles and his four a posteriori arguments, and Wiles' objection (AO1)
Evaluate whether religious experience and miracles justify belief in God, using conversion evidence (Lourdes, Alister Hardy) (AO2)
Write an evaluative essay with a sustained argument and justified verdict (AO2/AO3)
📋 Key Definitions and Core Concepts
religious experience: An experience in which the subject apprehends or feels touched by a divine or transcendent reality, directly or indirectly.
mystical experience: An experience of unity with or apprehension of the divine (Stace: extrovertive - unity in the world; introvertive - unity beyond all sense content).
numinous experience: Rudolf Otto's category: encounter with the 'wholly other' divine as mysterium tremendum et fascinans - awe-inspiring and attractive at once.
ineffability: James' first quality of mysticism: the experience defies adequate expression in language.
noetic quality: James' quality of mysticism: the experience yields insight or knowledge felt to be of objective truth, not mere feeling.
transiency: James' quality of mysticism: the experience is brief (minutes or hours) though its effects persist.
passivity: James' quality of mysticism: the subject feels received or seized by a power beyond the will (e.g. automatic writing, prophetic speech).
principle of credulity: Swinburne: if it seems to a subject that X is present, then probably X is present - appearances should be trusted unless there is special reason to doubt.
principle of testimony: Swinburne: other people's reports of experiences should be believed absent special reasons to doubt them.
wish-fulfilment: Freud's psychological explanation: religious experiences are projections of deep human desires for a father-figure and protection, not perceptions of God.
collective unconscious: Jung's concept: religious experience arises from universal archetypes shared by humanity - explaining religion psychologically without denying its value.
miracle (Hume): A transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent.
Types of religious experience: James, Stace, Otto and corporate experience
Classification: direct experiences (visions, voices, the numinous - God encountered immediately) vs indirect experiences (seeing God through the natural world, beauty, conscience). Spec: AQA 7062/1A section 3.1.3; OCR H573/01.
William James (The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902): studies mysticism empirically, from its fruits not its origins. Four qualities of the mystical state: ineffability (defies expression), noetic quality (yields insight felt as objective truth), transiency (brief, with lasting effects), passivity (the subject is received or seized). James' pragmatic conclusion: by their fruits (saintliness, moral transformation) mystical experiences have value and are worth taking seriously - 'the truth of the experience is tested by its fruits'.
Stace (Mysticism and Philosophy, 1960): distinguishes extrovertive mysticism (unity perceived in the world - all things as one) and introvertive mysticism (unity beyond all multiplicity and sense content); both share a common core, which Stace takes as evidence that mystics apprehend a single reality.
Otto (The Idea of the Holy, 1917): the numinous - the divine as mysterium tremendum et fascinans: wholly other, awe-inspiring (tremendum) and fascinating (fascinans); the experience is non-rational and pre-conceptual. Corporate experiences: Toronto Blessing (1994) and Pentecostal revivalism, Marian apparitions at Lourdes (1858, Bernadette Soubirous) - communal experiences resist the 'private delusion' charge but raise crowd-psychology worries.
Visions classified (Teresa of Avila): corporeal visions (sensed with the eyes - Bernadette at Lourdes), imaginative visions (seen in the mind's eye), and intellectual visions (apprehended without images - Teresa's own account of Christ's presence); voices are similarly graded. Conversion experiences: James' examples - Paul on the Damascus road, Augustine's garden conversion ('tolle lege') - sudden vs gradual conversion; James: conversion is the process by which a self 'divided and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right, superior and happy' - the most empirically tractable class of religious experience.
Credibility: Swinburne's principles and the argument from experience
Swinburne (The Existence of God, 1979): religious experience is evidence for God. Principle of credulity: if it seems to a subject that X is present, then probably X is present - we should trust appearances (of tables, people, God) unless there is special reason to doubt: the subject was drunk, known to be unreliable, or conditions were abnormal. Principle of testimony: others' reports of their experiences should be believed absent special reasons to doubt. Since millions report experiences of God and no special reason undermines them all, religious experience is substantial evidence; combined with the design argument it makes theism more probable than not.
Response 1: religious experience lacks the public checkability of sense experience - two people can see the same table; only one receives the vision. Swinburne's reply: private experience still counts; many everyday judgements (pain, memories) rest on private data.
Response 2: the experience is interpreted differently across traditions - a Buddhist, a Christian and a Hindu report incompatible objects. Hick's response: this is the ambiguous data problem - experiences are shaped by concepts, but so are all perceptions; the ambiguity does not defeat them all.
Conversion evidence: Alister Hardy's Religious Experience Research Unit collected thousands of first-hand accounts; documented conversions (e.g. James' examples) produce lasting moral fruit - James' 'fruits not roots' argument: even if experiences have psychological origins, their effects support their value.
Alston's perceptual model (Perceiving God, 1991): Christian mystical practice is a socially established doxastic practice in which God is experienced as an external object, analogically to sense perception; since the practice is socially established, coherent, self-supportive and productive of fruit, its beliefs are prima facie justified. Reply: rival practices (Buddhist, Hindu) are equally established, so Alston's epistemic conservatism limits the inference to one God - the ambiguity-of-object objection again. Hick's resolution: the experiences are all veridical responses to the same Reality, differently conceptualised - but this is Hick's pluralism, which itself flattens doctrinal differences.
Challenges: Freud, Jung and projection
Freud (The Future of an Illusion, 1927): religion is an illusion - a projection of infantile wishes for an all-powerful father-figure, protection from danger and cosmic justice; religious experiences are wish-fulfilments, not perceptions. Reply: Freud commits the genetic fallacy - explaining the origin of a belief does not show it is false; the desire for a father-figure could itself be explained by a real God who created beings oriented to him (the theistic rejoinder).
Jung (Psychology and Religion, 1938): religious experience arises from the collective unconscious - universal archetypes (God, the Self) shared by all humanity; religion is psychologically valuable (individuation, mental health) but the archetypes need not correspond to an external God. Jung: 'I do not believe, I know' that the psyche contains God-images - but the inference from archetype to God remains disputed. Reply: Jung's account explains universality, which might equally suggest a common object of experience (Stace's common core argument).
Feuerbach (The Essence of Christianity, 1841): God is a projection of idealised human nature - theology is anthropology; religious experiences reflect human self-worship. Marx: religion is the 'opium of the people', an illusory consolation shaped by material conditions. Weighing point: projection theories explain universality and psychological function, but the genetic fallacy reply and the fruits-not-roots argument (James) keep the experience argument alive - A* essays must stage both sides.
Verification angle (AQA/OCR language crossover): Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936) - religious experience reports are meaningless because they cannot be verified empirically; reply: the verification principle fails its own test and has been abandoned (Hick's eschatological verification gives religious claims a checkable structure).
Marx (Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 1843): religion is the 'opium of the people' - an illusory consolation shaped by material and economic conditions; religious experiences reflect class interests, not divine reality. Reply: the genetic fallacy again - and Marx's account explains why the oppressed find consolation but not why the experiences are false; James' fruits-not-roots argument survives all three projection theories at the level of value, though not at the level of veridicality.
Miracles: Hume, Wiles and Aquinas
Hume (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, 1748): a miracle is 'a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity'. Four a posteriori arguments against believing testimony of miracles: (1) no witness has enough experience of all laws of nature to be sure a law was transgressed; (2) human passion for the wonderful makes witnesses unreliable; (3) miracle testimony comes from ignorant, barbarous peoples and gains nothing from educated societies; (4) rival miracle claims in opposing religions cancel each other out - 'every miracle pretended on behalf of a false religion destroys the credit of the miracles of the true one'.
Replies to Hume: the wise-man proportioning belief rule may still favour belief if the testimony is strong enough (a modern medical record of an inexplicable cure); Hume's 'ignorant and barbarous' claim is empirically false (educated witnesses report miracles today, e.g. Lourdes medical bureau cases); rival religions may report the same class of events, so the cancellation is overstated.
Wiles (The Myth of God Incarnate contributor; Miracles essay): if God intervenes miraculously in some cases, his refusal to intervene in greater evils (Auschwitz) makes his action arbitrary and morally indefensible; therefore God acts uniformly (as creator) rather than occasionally - miracle reports are symbolic, not literal interventions. Reply: this sacrifices particular providence; believers hold that God's occasional action is consistent with a wider plan we cannot judge.
Aquinas: defines miracles more carefully - events outside the order of created causes, done by God's power; they can have natural explanations at a lower level yet still be miraculous as divine signs (this survives Hume's first argument better than Hume's own definition). Hick: miracles are events with religious significance to the believer - an interpretive (non-realist-friendly) view that sidesteps law-transgression debates.
Vatican II (Dei Verbum context): the Catholic tradition holds miracles as signs of revelation - events that authenticate divine speech; the Lourdes Medical Bureau documents 70 medically inexplicable cures among thousands of claims - the standard modern example for educated-witness replies to Hume. Weighing: Hume's critique of testimony is distinct from Wiles' critique of God's character - the first attacks whether reports should be believed, the second whether God would act selectively; A* essays must keep the two separate and assess each on its own terms.
Evaluation and exam technique
Spec coverage: AQA 7062/1A section 3.1.3 (Religious experience: visions, voices, the numinous, mystical and conversion experience; challenges from Freud and Jung) - and OCR H573/01 (religious experience; God as creator; miracles as challenges to God's existence and nature). WJEC/Eduqas Component 1 and CCEA include similar content.
Judgement patterns for A*: (1) Swinburne's principles make experience prima facie evidence, but the ambiguity-of-object objection limits its evidential force; (2) James' fruits-not-roots answer survives the genetic fallacy but does not show the experiences are veridical; (3) projection theories explain universality but commit the genetic fallacy; (4) Hume's critique of miracles is a critique of testimony, not of God's ability to act - Wiles and Aquinas shift the debate; a strong essay keeps these distinct.
Command words and structure: AQA Paper 1 Section A: 10-mark AO1 'Explain...' then 15-mark AO2 'Critically discuss...'. OCR: extended 'Critically discuss' essays. Plan: (1) classify experience/miracle with a scholar; (2) strongest argument for veridicality; (3) strongest challenge; (4) reply and weigh; (5) verdict.
Pitfalls: treating all religious experience as the same type (distinguish direct/indirect, numinous/mystical); presenting Freud as proving religion false (genetic fallacy); conflating Hume's four arguments into one; ignoring the ambiguity-of-object objection (examiners specifically reward it); assuming corporate experiences are more reliable without crowd-psychology analysis.
Examiner tips: memorise James' four qualities by name; quote Swinburne's credulity condition ('absent special reason'); give one concrete example (Lourdes, Toronto Blessing, Rowe's fawn is evil - use Paul's Damascus road for vision); keep Hume's testimony critique separate from Wiles' moral critique; end with a justified verdict.
💡 Worked Example
Exam-style: 'Religious experience is more convincing evidence for God than miracles.' Critically discuss this claim. [AQA 7062 15-mark AO2 essay / OCR H573 extended essay]
Mark-scheme logic: AO1 required: types of experience (James' four qualities; Stace; Otto's numinous); Swinburne's principles of credulity and testimony; challenges (Freud's wish-fulfilment, Jung's collective unconscious, ambiguity of object); Hume's definition of a miracle and four testimony arguments; Wiles' moral objection and Aquinas' definition. AO2 required: (1) experience - credulity makes millions of reports prima facie evidence, but the ambiguity of object across traditions limits the inference to any one God; (2) miracles - Hume attacks testimony, not God's power; educated-witness replies (Lourdes) weaken Hume; (3) Wiles: selective intervention is morally arbitrary, but believers accept inscrutable providence; (4) James' fruits-not-roots supports the value of experience without proving veridicality; (5) weigh - experience survives Hume's challenges better than miracles do (no law-transgression issue, larger body of testimony), but both remain evidential rather than demonstrative; conclude with a justified verdict.
❓ Practice Questions & Mark Schemes
Explain William James' four qualities of mystical experience. [10 marks AO1]
Answer: AO1 answer: James (The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902) studies mysticism from its fruits: (1) ineffability - the experience defies adequate expression; (2) noetic quality - it yields insight felt as objective truth, not mere feeling; (3) transiency - it is brief (minutes or hours) though its effects persist; (4) passivity - the subject feels received or seized by a power beyond the will. James' pragmatic conclusion: by their fruits (saintliness, moral transformation) mystical experiences are worth taking seriously. Marks awarded for: all four qualities named and accurately defined, and James' fruits-based approach.
'Religious experience provides no evidence for the existence of God.' Critically discuss. [15 marks AO2]
Answer: AO1 anchor: types of experience (James, Stace, Otto); Swinburne's principles; challenges (Freud, ambiguity of object). AO2 required: (1) Swinburne's credulity - if it seems X is present, probably X is present, absent special reason; millions report experiences, so they are substantial evidence; (2) challenge - experiences lack public checkability and the object is interpreted differently across traditions (ambiguity of object), limiting the inference to any one God; (3) Freud - wish-fulfilment explains experiences psychologically; reply: genetic fallacy - origin does not determine truth; (4) James - fruits not roots: even psychological origins do not defeat the value of the experience, but fruits do not prove veridicality; (5) weigh - experience is prima facie evidence but not proof; conclude with a justified verdict, e.g. 'no evidence' overstates the case - credulity and fruits give real if limited evidential weight.
Explain Swinburne's principles of credulity and testimony. [10 marks AO1]
Answer: AO1 answer: Swinburne (The Existence of God, 1979) uses religious experience as evidence for God. Principle of credulity: if it seems to a subject that X is present, then probably X is present - appearances should be trusted unless there is special reason to doubt (the subject was drunk, known unreliable, conditions abnormal). Principle of testimony: other people's reports of their experiences should be believed absent special reasons to doubt them. Since millions report experiences of God and no special reason undermines them all, religious experience is substantial evidence; combined with other arguments it makes theism more probable than not. Marks awarded for: both principles stated accurately, the 'special reason' condition, and the probabilistic conclusion.
'Hume's critique of miracles is decisive.' Critically discuss. [15 marks AO2]
Answer: AO1 anchor: Hume (Enquiry, Section X, 1748) - a miracle is 'a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity'; four testimony arguments. AO2 required: (1) strength - Hume's four arguments: insufficient experience of all laws; human passion for the wonderful; testimony from ignorant, barbarous peoples; rival miracle claims cancel each other; (2) replies - educated witnesses report miracles today (Lourdes medical bureau); Hume's proportioning rule may still favour belief given strong testimony; rival claims may report the same class of events, so cancellation is overstated; (3) Wiles - selective intervention is morally arbitrary (God prevents lesser evils but not Auschwitz), so miracle reports are symbolic; (4) Aquinas/Hick - miracles defined outside Hume's law-transgression framework survive the first argument; (5) weigh - Hume's critique of testimony is strong but attacks testimony, not God's ability to act; conclude with a justified verdict, e.g. not decisive - it defeats weak testimony but not all miracle claims, and alternative definitions escape it.
Explain Freud's and Jung's challenges to religious experience. [10 marks AO1]
Answer: AO1 answer: Freud (The Future of an Illusion, 1927) - religion is an illusion, a projection of infantile wishes for an all-powerful father-figure, protection and cosmic justice; religious experiences are wish-fulfilments, not perceptions. Jung (Psychology and Religion, 1938) - religious experience arises from the collective unconscious: universal archetypes (God, the Self) shared by all humanity; religion is psychologically valuable (individuation) but the archetypes need not correspond to an external God. Both explain religion psychologically; Freud dismisses, Jung re-values. Marks awarded for: both accounts accurately set out, the father-figure projection (Freud) and the archetypes/collective unconscious (Jung), and the difference in their conclusions.
'Corporate religious experiences are more reliable than individual experiences.' Critically assess. [15 marks AO2]
Answer: AO1 anchor: corporate experiences - Toronto Blessing (1994), Marian apparitions at Lourdes (1858); individual experiences - visions, voices, numinous. AO2 required: (1) strength - multiple independent witnesses resist the 'private delusion' charge; crowd corroboration parallels Swinburne's principle of testimony; (2) weakness - crowd psychology, emotional contagion and expectation effects explain corporate experiences as readily as individual ones; shared error is still error; (3) ambiguity of object - corporate experiences are interpreted within a tradition's expectations (Toronto Blessing interpreted Pentecostally), so the inference to any one God is limited; (4) James - fruits not roots: lasting moral fruit (Lourdes pilgrimages, transformed lives) supports value without proving veridicality; (5) weigh - multiple witnesses add evidential weight but crowd effects offset it; conclude with a justified verdict, e.g. corporate experiences are not obviously more reliable - the same psychological and interpretive challenges apply to both.
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